ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
With growing communication networks and digital communication, secure communication and data security is of paramount importance. Today one way to achieve secure communication is by the use of cryptography [1] , [2] , which concurrently ensures confidentiality of data in communication and in storage. For storing and accessing data securely there exist many ways which can guarantee privacy and confidentiality, such as data encryption and tamper resistance hardware. However, the problem becomes quite complex when it is required to compute publicly private data or to modify a function or algorithm in such a way that they are still executable while their privacy is ensured. This is where a Homomorphic Cryptographic schemes [3] may be used as it enables computation with encrypted data i.e. without knowing anything about the corresponding plain data. Using such schemes, we can perform computations on encrypted data and get back desired results after decryption. For coherence, the decrypted result has to be equal to the intended computed value, if performed on the original data. During the last few years, homomorphic encryption techniques have been studied extensively and have found application in many different cryptographic protocols operating over open and untrusted networks. Untrusted networks are given only an encrypted version of the data. The network will perform computation on this encrypted data. To ensure that the encrypted data is really being processed securely was addressed by Rivest [3] through homomorphic encryption. However, this scheme has security flaws as pointed out by Brickell and Yacobi [4] . Ever since such schemes have been improved and implemented for practical purposes as in the case of secret sharing scheme, threshold scheme, electronic auction, commitment scheme, oblivious transfer, anonymity, privacy, electronic voting, multiparty computation, zero knowledge proof, watermarking and fingerprinting [5] , protection of mobile agent and mix-nets.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 gives the basic definitions of the terminologies used in the paper. Section 3 emphasizes on the security aspects of encryption schemes. Homomorphic encryption schemes focusing on homomorphic encryption over integers are discussed in Section 4. Finally, we give the implementation results of Gentry's scheme and some parameter optimization in Section 5.
BASIC DEFINITIONS
In this section, we describe some basic terminology used in the paper.
Encryption and Decryption
Encryption is the conversion of data into a form, called a ciphertext that cannot be easily understood by unauthorized people and decryption is the process of converting encrypted data back into its original form, so that the authorized recipient can understand it. According to Kerckoffs' principle [6] , [7] , security must rely upon the secrecy of the scheme, but not on the obfuscation of the code. A cryptography scheme is assumed to be publically known whereas the secret piece of information such as key is responsible for the secrecy of the scheme. According to key management, encryption schemes are of two types: Symmetric and Asymmetric encryption schemes.
Symmetric Encryption
An encryption system in which the sender and receiver of a message share a single, common key that is used to encrypt and decrypt the message is called as Symmetric Encryption. Symmetric-key systems are faster, but their main drawback is that two parties wishing to communicate have to exchange the key in a secure way. In addition, scalability is problem as the number of users increase in the network. Due to its secret nature, symmetric-key cryptography is sometimes referred as secret-key cryptography.
Asymmetric Encryption
An encryption scheme is called asymmetric encryption if it uses two keys instead of one key as in symmetric encryption. One key encrypts the data and the other decrypts. It is also changeably referred to as public key cryptography. An important element of the public key system is that the public and private keys are related in such a way that only the public key can be used to encrypt messages and only its corresponding private key can be used to decrypt them. Moreover, it is virtually impossible to deduce the private key even if the public key is known. Public key cryptography was invented in 1976 by Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman [1] , [2] and the scheme was called Diffie-Hellman encryption. Security of this type of scheme is based on hard problems in mathematics, which are difficult to solve in polynomial time. However, the downside is that they are slower than the symmetric schemes due to non-trivial mathematical computations. That is why this encryption scheme is used only for encryption of small data or keys while symmetric scheme can be used for larger ones.
Homomorphic Encryption
Homomorphic encryption allows complex mathematical operations to be performed on encrypted data without revealing the contents of the original plain data. For plaintexts P1 and P2 and corresponding ciphertext C1 and C2, a homomorphic encryption scheme permits meaningful computation of P1 Θ P2 from C1 and C2 without revealing P1 or P2.The cryptosystem is additive or multiplicative homomorphic depending upon the operation Θ which can be addition or multiplication.
A homomorphic encryption scheme consists of the following four algorithms:
 Input-the security parameter λ.  Output-a tuple ( , ) consisting of the secret key and public key .
Encrypt ( , ):
 Input-a public key and a plaintext .  Output-ciphertext .
Decrypt ( , ):
 Input-a secret key and a ciphertext .  Output-the corresponding plaintext .
Evaluate ( , , ):
 Input-a public key , a circuit with inputs (of the set of allowed circuits) and a set of ciphertext , . . . . . , .  Output-a ciphertext .
Therefore, a homomorphic encryption scheme consists of all algorithms of a conventional public key encryption scheme and an extra one. The correctness-condition for the conventional part of a homomorphic encryption scheme is identical to that of a (non-homomorphic) public key encryption scheme.
The additional algorithm Evaluate is supposed to do the following:
If is a ciphertext corresponding to the plaintext for = 1 … and = ( , . . . . . , ), then Evaluate ( , , ) shall return a ciphertext corresponding to the plaintext ( , . . . . . . , ) for a circuit with inputs. A homomorphic encryption scheme is said to correctly evaluate (a set of circuits), if the correctness-condition on the algorithm Evaluate from above holds for all circuits ∈ .
Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE)
A homomorphic encryption scheme is fully homomorphic if it correctly evaluates all the circuits and the size of its decryption algorithm (as a circuit) is bounded by some (fixed) polynomial in the security parameter. Patrick [8] shows an illustrative algorithm using Figure 1 , and points out that the size constraint of the decryption algorithm excludes trivial schemes in which Evaluate simply outputs ( , ) and the decryption algorithm Decrypt is adapted to first decrypt the single component of and then apply the circuit to the decrypted part. 
Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption
A scheme is said to be somewhat homomorphic if it can deal with only a limited number of additions and multiplications before the decryption fails i.e. the depth of decryption circuit can go up to a limited extent.
A Homomorphic Encryption can be developed with existing mathematical primitives such as Integer factorization, Discrete Log problem, Learning with error, Lattice based schemes, Univariate and Multivariate schemes, Small Principal Ideal problem and others.
Bootstrappable Homomorphic Encryption
Bootstrapping is used by Gentry [9] , [10] to convert a somewhat homomorphic scheme to fully homomorphic encryption scheme. It is described in detail in Section 4.6.1 and 4.6.2.
SECURITY ASPECTS
Except one time pad, the security of any cryptosystem or any encryption scheme can be evaluated with respect to available computational infrastructure. Shannon [11] introduced the notion of perfect secrecy/unconditional security with characterized encryption scheme for which the If is a ciphertext corresponding to the plaintext for = 1 … and = ( , . . . . . , ), then Evaluate ( , , ) shall return a ciphertext corresponding to the plaintext ( , . . . . . . , ) for a circuit with inputs. A homomorphic encryption scheme is said to correctly evaluate (a set of circuits), if the correctness-condition on the algorithm Evaluate from above holds for all circuits ∈ .
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SECURITY ASPECTS
Except one time pad, the security of any cryptosystem or any encryption scheme can be evaluated with respect to available computational infrastructure. Shannon [11] introduced the notion of perfect secrecy/unconditional security with characterized encryption scheme for which the knowledge of the cipher text does not give any information either about the plain text or about the key. Under this assumption he proved that one time pad is perfectly secure and any other scheme neither symmetric nor asymmetric has been proved unconditionally secure. As far as asymmetric schemes are concerned, their security depends on the hardness of mathematical structure used to design the scheme. These mathematical structures are well defined and are hard to solve in general, but these problems can be solved easily if anyone knows the keys for such scheme; one can compare the hardness of the problem e.g. factoring large integers or solving discrete log [12] in a large group. Therefore, one can analyze that the security of an asymmetric encryption scheme depends on the intractability of mathematical structure, however, there may be other ways to break the system other than solving the underlying mathematical problem. In some applications, even the partial information gained from the ciphertext could endanger security, so the minimal requirement for an encryption scheme is that it must be impossible to recover the plain text for anybody not knowing the decryption key. This may be described in other words as "whatever an attacker can compute about the plaintext given the ciphertext, he can also compute without the ciphertext" [13] . The most well known deterministic cryptosystem RSA [14] is for a fixed encryption key and for a given plaintext, encryption will produce exactly the same ciphertext. Probabilistic encryption ensures generation of different ciphertext for the same plaintext message. Firstly, the notion of semantic security was introduced [15] at the same time as probabilistic encryption; in order to define what could be a strong security level, but not possible without probabilistic encryption. A probabilistic encryption is semantically secure if the knowledge of ciphertext does not provide any useful information about plaintext to some hypothetical adversary having only a reasonable computational power. In a more formal manner, for any function and any plaintext with only polynomial resources, the probability to guess ( ) (knowing f but not m) does not increase if the adversary knows a ciphertext corresponding to . This can be considered as a kind of perfect secrecy with polynomial resources. After defining semantic security, second notion of polynomials security was defined: the adversary chooses two plaintexts, and we secretly choose a random plaintext and provide the adversary a corresponding ciphertext. The adversary, still with polynomial resources, must guess which plaintext we had chosen. If the best he can do is to achieve a probability 1/2 +ε of success, then the encryption is said to be polynomially secure. Polynomial security is now known as the "indistinguishability of encryption" following the terminology and definitions of Goldreich [16] . Goldwasser and Micali proved the equivalence between polynomial security and semantic security [15] . It can be easily stated that a deterministic asymmetric encryption scheme cannot be semantically secure since it is not indistinguishable, as the adversary knows the encryption function, and thus can compute the single ciphertext corresponding to each plaintext.
In the case of asymmetric encryption schemes, the adversary knows the whole encryption material including both the encryption function and the encryption key. Thus, he can compute any pair ( , ( )). Moving from weakest to the strongest, we have the chosen plaintext, nonadaptive chosen ciphertext and the strongest is the adaptive chosen ciphertext attack. This leads to the IND-CPA, IND-CCA1, and IND-CCA2 notions in the literature. IND stands for indistinguishability whereas CPA and CCA signify chosen-plaintext attack and chosen-ciphertext attack respectively. Finally, CCA1 refers to the non-adaptive attacks and CCA2 to adaptive ones. Third notion for the security requirement is termed as non-malleability has also been introduced to complete the security analysis. Given a ciphertext = ( ), it should be hard for an opponent to produce a ciphertext  such that the corresponding plaintext , that is not necessary known to the opponent, has some known relation with . However, this notion was represented differently by Dolev et al. [17] , [18] .
The IND-CCA2 is the strongest requirement for an encryption but the best we can achieve through homomorphic encryption is IND-CPA. Even though we are discussing regarding the security of probabilistic encryption scheme this does not mean that deterministic asymmetric system are insecure; one can break the ciphertext in sub exponential time (which is still too long to be practicable). Additionally, we know that RSA (being deterministic) is still considered strong enough.
PRESENT HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION SCHEMES
We now present few existing encryption schemes and analyze their improvement and generalization of one over the other. In the previous section, we had started our discussion with security and asserted the need of probabilistic encryption in comparison to deterministic encryption. The very first of these is RSA [14] which being deterministic and multiplicative homomorphism scheme offers security based on the difficulty of factoring , where N is product of two large primes.
We next define and compare probabilistic encryption schemes. Most of these are somewhat homomorphic (additive or multiplicative) and few of them are fully homomorphic encryption schemes.
Goldwasser-Micali Scheme
Goldwasser and Micali (GM) [13] , [15] proposed the first probabilistic encryption system in 1982. The basic principle of GM is to partition a well-chosen subset of integers modulo into two secret parts:
and . Then, encryption selects a random element of to encrypt , and decryption allows knowing in which part the randomly selected element lies. The core point lies in the way the subset is chosen, and to partition it into and . GM uses Group Theory to achieve the following: the subset is a group of invertible integers modulo with a Jacobi symbol, with respect to , equal to one. The partition is generated by another group  , composed of the elements that are invertible modulo with a Jacobi symbol, with respect to equal to one. With these settings, it is possible to split into two parts: and \ . In this scheme to encrypt a bit , sender picks at random an integer ∈ * , and computes = mod (note that is a quadratic residue if and only if = 0). To get back to the plaintext, receiver determines if is a quadratic residue or not. To do so, he uses the property that the Jacobi symbol ( / ) is equal to (1) . This scheme encrypts 1 bit of information, while its output is usually 1024 bits long. = , and being large prime numbers, and is a quadratic non-residue modulo n whose Jacobi symbol is 1. This scheme proved to be semantically secure against a passive adversary. The security behind this scheme is intractability of quadratic residuosity problem.
As an extension of the above scheme, Benaloh [19] is a generalization of the Goldwasser-Miccali with encryption cost almost the same as that of GM while decryption cost is estimated to be high.
Paillier Encryption Scheme
Paillier scheme [20] is an efficient, probabilistic, additive and scalar homomorphic encryption scheme proposed in 1999 based on arithmetic in the ring of integers modulo where is the product of two large primes. One of its extensions is the elliptic curve Paillier scheme, which was recently published by Galbraith [21] . The elliptic curve [22] Paillier scheme is a generalization of Paillier's cryptosystem [20] on elliptic curves over rings. Paillier himself tried to generalize his scheme to the elliptic curve setting by using anomalous elliptic curves over rings, but Galbraith found security flaws in this generalization [21] whereas the elliptic curve Paillier scheme can be proven semantically secure relative to a new defined problem. Paillier and his further generalization [21] are examples of the probabilistic, additively homomorphic cryptosystems, which are also scalar homomorphic. The performances of the elliptic curve Paillier scheme and its generalization are by far slower than the original Paillier scheme since they operate on elliptic curve modulo large numbers. One interesting point is that the elliptic curve version is based on a slightly different assumption than Paillier's original version. This assumption may also hold true even if the original Paillier assumptions are broken.
We have implemented Paillier scheme in C/C++ using GMP and NTL libraries and tested on a high end-PC. Below we give the description of implemented Paillier [20] scheme and the observations are as follows:-Let be a polynomial-time algorithm that, on input 1 , outputs ( , , ) where = and and are -bit primes. The scheme is as follows:
KeyGen: Input 1 run (1 ) to obtain ( , , ). The public key is , and the private key is 〈 , ( )〉, where ( ) is the Euler's Totient function.
Enc: Input a public key and a message ∈ * and output the ciphertext
Dec: Input a private key is 〈 , ( )〉 and a ciphertext , and compute,
Input: = 3, = 11; = 5, = 7 We computed = 44 and = 523 On one side we obtained encryption of ( Θ ) as 962 and on the other side we also obtained ( Θ ) as 962. This shows that Homomorphic property Enc ( )Enc ( ) = Enc ([ + mod ] ) is satisfied. Similar observations have been taken for larger numbers.
Damgard-Jurik Scheme
Damgard and Jurik [23] managed to generalize the original Paillier scheme to higher moduli to enable a wider application scope. Galbraith [21] developed a generalization of the elliptic curve Paillier scheme. They operate on elliptic curves modulo large numbers.
Damgard-Jurik [23] gave an encryption scheme, which is a probabilistic, additive and scalar homomorphic cryptographic scheme. The scheme works as follows:
Key generation:
 Choose an RSA modulus = = (2 + 1)(2 + 1) with primes , ′, , ′.  Select an element g ∈ , where denotes the group of all squares in ( / ) * Choose, ∈ / where, = ′ ′ = { }.  Compute =  The public key is ( , g, ) and the secret key is .
Encryption:
 Choose an integer > 0 so that ∈ /  Choose a random ∈ / , where = 4 .  The ciphertext is ( , ) = g mod , ( mod ) ( + 1) mod =: ( , ).  Let , denote a function with (( + 1) ) = mod . An algorithm that computes this function, i.e., that calculates the discrete logarithm with respect to the element ( + 1) is described in Damgard and Jurik [21] .
Decryption:
 The message can be found as = ( ( mod ) ) = (g mod ) ( + 1) (g mod ) ) = (( + 1) mod )
The scheme is additively homomorphic since ( , ) and ( , ) are given, we can compute
Hence, the algorithm Add can efficiently be implemented by multiplying the input ciphertext and applying a blinding algorithm.
Okamoto and Uchiyama
It is a probabilistic encryption scheme [24] whose trapdoor is essentially different from other previous scheme including RSA-Rabin and Diffie-Hellman. This scheme employs efficient (polynomial time) algorithm for solving the discrete logarithm over a specific subgroup. In order to improve previous schemes like Goldwasser-Miccali [13] , [15] , Naccache-Stern [25] and Behaloh [6] , the authors decided to change the base group [26] . Security of the above scheme is based on the intractability of factoring = against passive adversaries but the weakness is against active attack, though it can be improved using the random oracle model [27] . This scheme is semantically secure under the − subgroup assumption, which is comparable to the quadratic residue and higher degree residue assumption. Let ( , ) be a ciphertext of the plaintext as randomized by .
( , ) ( , ) mod = ( + , ), if + < . Anyone can change a ciphertext, = ( , ) into another ciphertext ' = ′ mod , while preserving plaintext of (i.e., ′ = ( , " )), and the relationship between and ′ can be concealed. This homomorphic property is used in electronic voting and other cryptographic protocols.
Boneh-Goh-Nissim
It is a homomorphic public key encryption scheme based on finite groups of composite order that support a bilinear map. This construction moves in the direction of Palliier [20] and achieves an additive homomorphism with an extra functionality that is allowed by using bilinear map. With the help of this, we can perform arbitrary additions and one multiplication (followed by arbitrary additions) on the encrypted data. As a result, we can evaluate multivariate polynomial of total degree 2 on encrypted values. Subgroup decision problem is the hardness assumption behind the security of this scheme. Let an element of a group be of composite order = . It is infeasible to decide whether it belongs to a subgroup of order or . The most distinctive element of this scheme is that both multiplication and addition is allowed unlike the previous case of somewhat homomorphic scheme with one exception of Sander et al. [28] . It provides the ability to evaluate NC 1 [28] circuit in encrypted values, but their constructions also apply to 2-DNF [29] formula, with one weakness of increasing length of ciphertext with increase in depth of the 2-DNF formula (unlike the Boneh-Goh-Nissim scheme [29] ). Since ciphertext size is independent of the formula size or depth property, the total communication in the basic step of the Kushilevitz-Ostrovsky private information retrieval (PIR) protocol is reduced from √ to √ in a database of size . Other applications are in efficient election system based on homomorphic encryption and protocol for universally verifiable computation.
Homomorphic Encryption over Integers
There is always a challenge to construct Homomorphic Encryption Schemes with simple mathematical constructs. Gentry accepted this challenge by constructing fully homomorphic scheme from a bootstrappable somewhat homomorphic scheme and made a fully homomorphic scheme over integers [30] . The focus is in the conceptual simplicity and it merely uses addition and multiplication over the integer instead of using ideal lattice over polynomial ring [10] . The scheme is hence, less complex in comparison to that using ideal lattice. This is the second "bootstrappable" scheme, which uses only modular arithmetic, and security of the scheme lies in the hardness of finding the approximate GCD [32] . The decryption circuit is squashed by applying Gentry's transformation [9] , [10] to obtain a fully homomorphic encryption scheme.
In this section, first, we describe Gentry's somewhat homomorphic scheme, then illustrate how it can be converted into fully homomorphic encryption scheme. Then, we talk about how the public key and ciphertext size may be reduced and finally, discuss the security assumptions of the scheme.
This somewhat homomorphic public key encryption ε has four algorithms: the usual KeyGen, Encrypt, and Decrypt, and an additional algorithm Evaluate. The algorithm Evaluate takes as input a public key , a circuit , a tuple of ciphertexts = 〈 , . . . , 〉 (one for every input bit of ), and outputs another ciphertext .
Keygen( ):
 The secret key is a random odd -bit integer:
 Choose , … , $ ← ∩ [0, ) subject to the condition that the largest is odd.  Relabel 's so that after sorting that is the largest.
 Choose a random subset ⊆ {1, 2, … , } and a random integer in (2 , 2 )
Evaluate ( , , , … ):
 Given the (binary) arithmetic circuit with inputs and ciphertexts , apply the addition and multiplication gates of to the ciphertexts, performing all operations over the integers, and returning the resulting integer.
Decrypt(s , ):
It is to be noted that [ ] = − , and since is odd, we can instead decrypt using the formula
Bootstrappable Encryption
Let = (KeyGen, Encrypt, Decrypt, Evaluate) be a homomorphic encryption scheme, and for every value of the security parameter , let Cε ( ) be a set of circuits with respect to which is correct. We say that is bootstrappable if (λ) ⊆ Cε ( ) holds for every λ.
Converting Somewhat to Fully H.E. and Squashing the Circuit
To make a scheme fully homomorphic we follow Gentry's [10] approach. The encryption scheme is bootstrappable as per the above definition. When the decryption equation ( ′ ← − ) is computed, it requires a Boolean circuit which gets deeper (by a constant factor) than what somewhat homomorphic schemes can handle. So, Gentry's transformation [30] is used to "squash the decryption circuit". The transformation involves the addition of some extra information to the public key to 'post process' the ciphertext. The post-processed ciphertext can be decrypted more efficiently than the original ciphertext, thus making the scheme bootstrappable. Let = , = ′ , Θ= ω( • log ) be three more parameters, which are function of the security parameter . For a secret key * = and public key * from the original somewhathomomorphic scheme * ,we add to the public key a set = { , … … Θ } of rational number in [0,2) with bits of precision, such that there is a sparse subset ⊂ {1, … . , Θ} of size with ∑ ∈ ≈ 1 ( 2). We also replace the secret key by the indicator vector of the subset . The squashed scheme is:
KeyGen:
 * = and * as before.
 Set 2 .  Choose at random a Θ-bit vector with Hamming weight , = 〈 , . . . , Θ 〉 and let S = { : = 1}.  Choose at random integers = ( 2 ), = 1, … . ., Θ, subject to the condition that ∑ ∈ = (mod 2 ).  Set = /2 and = { , . . . , Θ }. Hence, each is a positive number smaller than two, with bits of precision after the binary point. Additionally, [∑ ∈ ] = (1/ ) − Δ for some |Δ | < 2 .  Output the secret key = and public key = ( * , ).
Encrypt and Evaluate:
 Generate a ciphertext * as before (i.e., an integer).  Then for ∈ {1, . . . , Θ}, set ← [ * • ] , keeping only = log + 3 bits of precision after the binary point for each .  Output both * and = 〈 , . . . , Θ 〉.
Decrypt:
Apart from mathematical point of view we explain two keywords (squashing and bootstrapping) of the fully homomorphic encryption in simple words. As we know that in somewhat homomorphic scheme, we can perform a limited number of addition and multiplication on the ciphertext. The reason behind this is that, every ciphertext has a noise term, which goes on increasing when we apply homomorphic operations on the ciphertext and it sometimes becomes so intolerable that it becomes difficult to get the correct decryption of the ciphertext. These noise terms limit the degree of polynomial we can apply to the ciphertext. Here, the degree of polynomial defines the number of operation or in other words, it defines the depth of the circuit.
Gentry [30] demonstrated how to squash the decryption procedure so that it can be expressed as a low degree polynomial in the bits of the ciphertext and secret key. To reduce the noise component, instead of evaluating a low degree decryption polynomial on the bits of ciphertext and secret key as in regular decryption, Gentry did homomorphically on the encryption of those bits. The obtained result is not the plaintext, but another ciphertext for the given plaintext, whose noise component is small as compared to the original ciphertext. Creation of this ciphertext is After this ciphertext refresh procedure, noise in ciphertext is reduced. Therefore, the number of operations applied on the refreshed ciphertext is no more a restriction; thus making the scheme fully homomorphic. To make the scheme fully homomorphic, it must be "bootstrappable" and the necessary condition to make it bootstrappable is that the degree of the polynomial that can be evaluated on ciphertexts exceeds the degree of the decryption polynomial (two times, since one must allow for a subsequent addition or multiplication of refreshed ciphertexts). Gentry introduced certain transformations [9] to reduce the degree of decryption polynomial. Instead of using the original secret key, the decryption procedure uses a very sparse subset of values that adds up to the secret key; the full set of values is made part of the public key. To apply the new decryption procedure, the original ciphertext must be "expanded" using the full set of public keys. This expanded ciphertext can then be decrypted with a low-degree polynomial in the bits of the new secret key (which are the characteristic vector of the sparse subset sum); this is called the "squashed decryption" procedure.
How to reduce the ciphertext size
Though the "somewhat" version of the homomorphic encryption is quiet efficient and secure but it has some shortcomings, like big public key size and larger cipher text size, while encrypting merely the binary bits. There are two techniques to reduce the size of ciphertext size, which are as follows:
In the first technique, while Encrypt reduces the ciphertext modulo the public key element , we can do the same in Evaluate, because after just one multiplication the ciphertext becomes much larger than , so modular reduction includes a large multiple of hence introducing an intolerable error. So to reduce the ciphertext size during Evaluate, we add to the public key more elements of the form = + 2 where the r 's are chosen from the interval (−2 , 2 ) but the 's are chosen much larger than for the other public key elements. Specifically, for = 0, . . . , it can be set:
therefore getting ∈ [2 , 2 ] . During Evaluate, every time we have a ciphertext that grows beyond 2 , we reduce it first modulo , then modulo , and so on all the way down to , at which point we again have a ciphertext of bit-length no more than .
A single operation at most doubles the bit-length of the ciphertext. Hence, after any one operation the ciphertext cannot be larger than 2 , and therefore the sequence of modular reductions involves only small multiples of the s, which means that it only adds a small amount of noise. In the second technique, we have reduced the size but to a limited extent. It is still of order of , so even this size creates a communication overhead. However, achieving this is not free and it lands us with some limitation. We can use this compression technique on the final output ciphertext, after the application of Evaluate has been completed. We add a generator belonging to the group whose order is a multiple of the secret key . Now the compressed ciphertext is * ← which must belong to group . This adds another hardness assumption as in Discrete Logarithm Problem and the plaintext can be retrieved as ← ( * ) and = .
How to reduce the public key size
Since the size of public key in Gentry's scheme is quite large, it is always desirable to reduce the key size without compromising the security and efficiency. In this scheme, public key is of order of , where is security parameter as described. There is a technique [31] , which reduces the public key size to the order of . This technique works by using quadratic form in the public key elements instead of a linear form, which enables the reduction of public key size from down to roughly 2√ integer of bits.
Security assumption
Security of this scheme is based on the hardness of the approximate integer divisor problem. This problem was introduced by Howgrave-Graham [32] in 2001. The aim of the problem is to recover the greatest common divisor say in polynomial time from two given integers and . If the recovered value has small deviation (say an additive error) from its actual value or there is a small deviation in the value of or or both, then recovering is called as approximate common divisor problem. There are two version of the problem, first is General Approximate Common Divisor problem (GACDP) and second is the Partial Approximate Common Divisor problem (PACDP). Illustratively, given two input = + and = + where and can be viewed as additive errors in and respectively satisfying the conditions: | ≤ | and | ≤ |. The output is called as approximate GCD (appGCD) if it satisfies the following conditions ( + ) = 0 and ( + ) = 0. If one of the above input is exactly known (without an error) i.e. = 0, then the general GACDP reduces to PACDP. In context to the Genry's integer algorithm, s are the input to approximate GCD algorithm and the secret key is the output of the algorithm. The scheme is supposed to be secure because of difficulty in retrieving . It reduces to partial setting if is zero.
There are some proposed algorithms to calculate appGCD for both general and partial versions. They are as follows: a) Continued fraction based approach b) Lattice based approach The (continued fraction based) partially approximate common divisor algorithm PACD_CF [32] , is defined as follows: its input is two integers , such that < . The algorithm should output all integers = , > 1/2, such that there exist an with | | < = ,and divides both + and ,or report that no such exists (under the condition on we are assured that there are only polynomially many solutions for .
The (continued fraction based) equi-sized GACDP algorithm GACD_CF [32] , is defined as follows: its input is two integers , subject to ∼ , < . The algorithm should output all integers = , > 1/2, such that there exist integers , with | |, | | < = where = (2 − 1, 1 − ), and divides both + and + , or report that no such exists (under thecondition on we are assured that there are only polynomially many solutions for ).
The (lattice based) partially approximate common divisor algorithm PACD_L [32] , is defined as: its input is two integers , such that < .and two real numbers , ∈ (0 . . . 1). Let us define = and = where = − . The algorithm should output all integers > such that there exists an with | | < ,and divides both + and , or report that no such exists (under the conditions on and we are assured that there are only polynomially many solutions for ).
The (lattice based) equi-sized GACDP algorithm GACD_L [32] , is defined as: its input is two integers , subject to ∼ , < , and two real numbers , ∈ (0 . . . 2/3). Let us define = and = where = 1 − (1 2 ⁄ ) − 1 − − (1 2 ⁄ ) -The algorithm should output all integers > such that there exists an , with | |, | | < ,and divides both + and + , or report that it is unlikely that such a exists (under the conditions on and , we are assured that there are only polynomially many solutions for ).
OBSERVATIONS AND RESULTS
The above described Gentry's [30] homomorphic scheme has been implemented in C/C + + using GMP and NTL libraries and tested on a 3-GHz system. Implementation results are presented below along with homomorphic encryption results on plaintext. We have also analyzed various parameters used in the scheme and have suggested some parameter optimization to make the scheme more secure. The results are as follows: mod 2 = 1 = LSB of ( 1 * 2) and hence the multiplicative homomorphism is also established.
Similar observations have been taken for bigger values of public key ( = 512,1024). Parameter Analysis: With optimum and judicious choice of parameters, we can make the scheme more secure, efficient and less prone to cryptanalysis. We performed parameter analysis and our observations are as follows: a) To make the scheme more secure we can take (secret key) as a large prime instead of taking it as large odd integer. b) For the partial version ( = ) of the above scheme, one should not be able to find non trivial factors of . One way to address this problem is to take as a large prime integer. c) Both in partial version and general version, small common factor of ′ and ′ leads to vulnerability of the scheme, i.e. ′ , ′ must be pair-wise coprime. d) Noise is also a critical parameter regarding the security of the scheme. e) If say, = . and = . + with | | < 2 , one can guess and compute gcd( , − ) to recover . The best algorithm for computing GCD's is the StehleZimmermann algorithm [33] with time complexity ( ) for integers of bits. The attack complexity is then 2 . ( ). Therefore the attack is thwarted if = ( ).
